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SIMULATING  THE PERFORMANCE  OF A MULTIPLE EXCHANGE
MECHANISM  MARKET
Richard L.  Kilmer and Ronald W.  Ward
The impact of a monopolist or monopsonist on  by  the  buyer  (node  k+l),  thus  potentially
the price and output performance  in comparison  eliminating much of the risk of quality uncertain-
with  perfectly  competitive  markets  is  well  ties.  Such  control  benefits  may  be  partially  or
documented.  These  markets  are  coordinated  totally offset by the transactions cost of maintain-
through spot market  exchanges.  However,  most  ing the  non-spot exchange  mechanisms.
markets  have  combinations  of alternative  verti-
cal exchange  mechanisms (contracts,  vertical in-
tegration,  spot  exchange,  etc.).  The  price  and  MULTIPLE  EXCHANGE  MECHANISM
output  performance  of  a  multiple  exchange  MODEL
mechanism (M.E.M.)  market  when compared  to
a  spot  exchange  mechanism  (S.E.M.)  market  Commodity x is produced  with the input w as-
needs  additional  conceptual  modeling.  This  suming a traditional type production  function as
paper  evaluates  the  relative  performance  be-  expressed  in equation  (1),
tween  markets  with  and  without  multiple  ex-
change  mechanisms,  using a model derived with
an explicit set of production  functions.
A  decline  of  spot  markets  and  the  continual
emergence  of contracts  and  vertical  integration  product
calls  for a better understanding  of the economic  Y
consequences  of using multiple  exchange  mech-
anisms.  Most research has  dealt with analysis of
firm  level  inducements  for  employing  alterna-
tives to  spot  markets  (Arrow,  Buccola,  Logan,
Perry,  Stigler,  Williamson).  This  article  models  n-nl  ni  N  k+
the  concept  of a multiple  exchange  mechanism
market,  using  Cobb-Douglas-type  production
functions.  Simulated  equilibrium  price and  mar- 
ket output indexes  are developed  to draw  impli-  vertical
cations relative  to the performance  of a multiple  spot  contract  integration
exchange  mechanism  (M.E.M.)  market  relative
to a spot exchange  mechanism (S.E.M.) market.
The alternative  mechanisms  for exchange  are il-
lustrated  in Figure  1.
The transfer of x from node k to k+ 1 through a  -ml  NODE  k
spot transaction  does  not provide  a mechanism
for direct control  of the production and  transfer 
functions  by  the  buyer  or  seller.  Such  product  I
characteristics  are quality,  time of delivery,  and
quantity are left virtually uncontrolled, except by
the  spot price negotiated.  In contrast,  contract-  product
ing  can provide  direct control  over  the produc- 
tion  and  transfer functions.  The risk  of inferior
product  characteristics,  uncertain  prices,  and
poor technology can be reduced.  With backward  FIGURE  1.  Alternative  Exchange  Arrange-
integration, product characteristics  and the tech-  ments for Product x
nology  used to produce x are directly controlled  -
Richard  L.  Kilmer is  Assistant  Professor, and  Ronald  W.  Ward is  Professor at the University  of Florida (authors  are listed  in alphabetical  order).
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Economic  and Statistics  Service of the USDA under research agreement  58-319X-8-2494-X and  support
from North Central  Regional Project  117.
Florida  Agricultural  Experiment Station  Journal  Series  No.  3887.
17(1)  x  =  aO [l+d][w]al  marginal  cost of x  is equated  to  the price  of x.
This cost includes  fixed and variable production
where 0 < al < 1.0 and (1  + d) >= 0.0. If param-  cost  and  the  relative  difference  in  transactions
eter  d  >  0,  then  the  productivity  of w  can  be  cost among  coordinating  mechanisms.  The cost
improved with non-spot exchange.  For example,  of producing  x  with  specific  production  charac-
if, through  vertical  integration, nl firms  at node  teristics  is defined in equation  (4),  where Pw in-
k+ 1 in Figure  1 start producing x, the firms then  cludes  the  spot market  transactions  cost  associ-
have  greater  control  over  the  technical  pro-  ated  with transferring  product x from  node  k to
cesses.  Productivity  may be  improved if d  >  0,  k+ 1 plus the price of the input w.
and technical  control  over  production  may lead
to the  output of x having  more desirable  quality  (4)  c  =  w Pw [l+q]  + fixed costs
characteristics.  However,  the  situation  could
exist  in  which  a  non-spot  mechanism  leads  to  The component q represents the net difference in
lower  productivity  (e.g.,  non-mechanized  har-  transactions  cost for supplying x through  one of
vesting) such  that -1  < d < 0.  the  non-spot  exchange  mechanisms  instead  of
The  input x used in producing  y is assumed to  the  spot  mechanism.  Note  that  the  1 +  q  >  0
be  usable  within  a  narrow  band  of product  implies a positive cost, but does not preclude q <
characteristics-timing,  quantity,  quality,  loca-  0.  Non-spot  exchange  could  lead to greater  ef-
tion.  For the  vertically  integrated firm,  x would  ficiencies,  in which case  -1  < q < 0.
be  produced  with those  product  characteristics  Using  equations  (1) and (4),  the  supply  curve
needed for the production  of y.  Under contract-  for x follows,  assuming marginal cost equals Px:
ing,  the  producer  of  y  can  specify  the  desired
product  characteristics  for  x  and  improve  pro-  (5)  xs  =  SO  [Px](al/(-))
ductivity.  Purchasing  x  in the  spot market  may
lead  to  variation  in  product  characteristics,  where  SO  =  [aO  (l+d)[Pw  al/(l+q)]a].(l/l-al))
which  reduces  the  productivity  of x.  Product  Spot demand  (xds) and  supply  (xss) are  defined
characteristics  can also exchange  as x is  distrib-  when  d  =  q  =  f =  0,  and  from this  base,  both
uted from node  k to k+ 1. Both  contracting  and  non-spot  supply  and  demand  are  expressed  as
vertical integration may provide more direct con-  xdv  =  [h][xdx]  and  xsv  =  [r][xss],  letting
trol  relative  to  spot  transactions  as  x is  distrib-  h=[l+f]li/-bl))andr=[l+q](-al/'l-al))[l+d].(/l-al))
uted to k+ 1.  Given that n firms demand and m supply x of which
Let f represent the adjustments in y from using  nl and ml use a nonspot exchange, then the market
input  x  where  the  product  characteristics  of x  demand and supply are readily  calculated for the
vary  within  the  narrow  band  discussed  above.  M.E.M.  market.2
The  production process  assumed is
(6)  xD =  Exds  +  hh  xds = [n-nl+nlh]xds
(7)  xS  =  Yxss  + Ir  xss =  [m-ml+mlr]xss
where (1  + f) >  = 0.0 and 0 < bl < 1.0;  y = final 
firm output; and x  =  input with a band of varia-  Define Ed =  l/  ) and Es  (al/(l-a)), and
tion in product characteristics.  Assuming  that x  equating  equations  (6)  and  (7),  then  an  equilib-
is  employed  up  to  where  the  marginal  value  rium price 
product  equals  the  input  price  (Px)  and  using  Ds  n(l-  n  +  n*h)  /(Ed+Es))
equation (2),  the derived  individual firm demand  (8)  Px  =
for x follows  in equation (3):  Ss  m(l - m* + mr)
where  n*=nl/n and m*=ml/m.  Note in (8)  that
(3)  xd  =  DO  [Px],-(1/(1-bl))  the  equilibrium  price depends  on both spot  and
non-spot activities.
where  DO = [ bO bl Py [1  + f] ] (/(1-bl)  and Py =
price of  output y.
The  demand  for  x  should  differ  among  ex-  RELATIVE  PRICE PERFORMANCE
change  mechanisms  because  f  likely  differs
across  exchange arrangements.  If f > 0, then the  The equilibrium  price  in equation  (8)  is based
demand  through  non-spot  mechanisms  exceeds  on  a M.E.M.  market.  Comparing  this price to a
that from  spot demand because  S.E.M.  market  gives  an index of relative  prices
(RP)  as in equation (9).
[ 1  +f] (/(l-bl))  > 1.0.
(9)  RP  =  ln*+  n*h  (1/(Ed+Es))
The firm's  supply  of x is generated  where the  1 - m*+m*r
' For example,  time delays,  excess handling,  transportation  and  shipping  facilities,  storage practices,  and  quantity  delivered  may be better  controlled  via the  non-spot
arrangements.
2 It is  assumed  that the market demand  curve  of the input  factor x is  the horizontal summation  of the  individual firm's derived  demand functions.  This  requires that the
product  being produced  y does  not vary  in price as  the quantity  of factor  input  x increases.
18Values  of RP >  1.0 imply  a greater  equilibrium  Taylor  series  approximation  to  the  function.
price  under  a  M.E.M.  market  relative  to  a  Using the expansion up to the first derivative, the
S.E.M. market,  and this condition will be true so  remaining  components  of (11)  are approximated
long  as  1 +  n*[h-1]  >  1 +  m*[r-1].  Further-  as: 4
more,  the  supply and  demand must be equal for
that proportion  of x which  is exchanged through  (12)  [l-m*  +m*r]E  1  +Ed[r-  1]m*
each  mechanism.  Hence,  in  equilibrium,  a
weighting  of the demand shifter (h) must equal a  (13)  [1-n*+n*h]-EEs  1-Es[h- l]n*
weighting of the supply  shifter (r), such that [n*/
(1-n*)]h  =  [m*/(1-m*)]r,  or  equally  r  =  Then M.E.M.  supplies exceed S.E.M. supplies if
[(1-m*)/m*][n*/(1-n*)]h.  Using these  two con-
ditions,  the  determining  factor  for  establishing  (14)  1-Es[h-l]n* < 1+Ed[r-l]m*
the  direction  of  RP  reduces  to  that  derived  in
(10).  Equation  (14)  can be used  to explore  the condi-
tions  in  which  output  from  a  M.E.M.  market
(10)  h[m*-n*]  > [(1-n*)/n*][n*-m*]  would exceed that from a spot mechanism  mar-
ket.  Using the  equilibrium  condition shown ear-
Using  (10)  and  given  that h  >  0.0,  n*  <  1.0,  lier,  where  r  =  [(1-m*)/m*][n*/(1-n*)]h  and
and m* <  1.0, then if m* > n*,  the M.E.M. mar-  substituting into (14)  for r, the constraints  on the
ket is expected to have inflationary effects on the  product characteristics  parameter (f) follow.
input  price Px.  Whereas,  if m* <  n*,  price  will
fall in  the  M.E.M.  market  relative  to  a market  Es n*  +  Ed m*  1-n*
with all spot transactions.  This conclusion shows  (15)) 
the  direction  of  change,  while  all  parameters
must be known if the absolute level of RP is to be  Es n*  +  Ed m*  I-n* (/E)
calculated.  Referring  to the  relative price  index  (16)  f  >Es  +  -1E
(equation  (9))  and using the condition where  m*  Es(1-n*)+Ed(1-m*)  n*
> n*,  then the relative price will be greater  than  f 
one  so long as  [n*][h]  >  [m*][r].  This inequality  h  s  h  mh  e eecte,  gven altenatve
has a more intuitive interpretation in that so long  changes that might be expected,  given alternative has a more intuitive interpretation  in that so long  levels  of non-spot coordination  (n*,m*).  Simula-
as the shift in the demand resulting from the use  leves of non-spot coordination  (n*,md ). Simula-
of a  non-spot  mechanism  exceeds  the  supply  tions  of these  limits  are  illustrated  in  Figures  2 of  a  non-spot  mechanism  exceeds  the  supply  and 3.  Before  discussing  (16)  in detail,  one  gen-
shift,  the  resulting  equilibrium  price  will  rise  an  3  Beore discsin  (1)  i  detail,  one  gen-
above that  with  spot transactions  only  eral coordinate  of interest occurs  when n*=m*.
e tt  wh  st  t  o  In this  restrictive  case,  total output will  always
be greater in a M.E.M.  market  so long as f >  0
RELATIVE  OUTPUT  PERFORMANCE  [see equation (2)].
If the proportion  of non-spot  coordination  is
Supplies  forthcoming  from  M.E.M.  and  weighted to  the  demand  side  (i.e.,  n*>m*),  the
S.E.M.  markets  are  readily  shown,  using  the  M.E.M.  market  output  will be  larger so long  as
supply function in (7) and the equilibrium price of  the  product  characteristics  (f)  differential  be-
(8). The ratio of these supplies then gives a direct  tween  spot and non-spot  commodities  is greater
measurement  of the perfo  of teof  the  M.E.M.  than the negative f-min in Figure 2. Assuming that
market to the S.E.M. markets,  as derived in equ-  non-spot  exchange  mechanism  improves  pro-
ation (11).3  ductivity (i.e., f >0), then a M.E.M. market leads
to  greater  output when  n*  >  m*.  But when the
(11)  RS  = [  i-m*+m*r](Ed(Ed+E))  [1  _  proportion of sellers using a non-spot mechanism
n*+n*h](Es/(Ed+Es))  is greater  than  those buying  (m*  > n*),  then  in
order for M.E.M.  markets  to be larger than spot
When  RS  is  greater  than  one,  the  M.E.M.  markets,  the  characteristics  of  the  product  ex-
supplies exceed S.E.M. market output.  Equation  changed  through a non-spot mechanism must be
(11) does not provide an immediate  set of condi-  significantly  greater than zero or f > f-min.  The
tions  on  the  parameters  for  determining  when  value  of f must be  above  the  surface  shown  in
RS >  1.0 because both values in the brackets  are  Figure 2.
raised to a power of the elasticities. If RS > 1.0  The relative  magnitude of output in a M.E.M.
then  [1-m*+m*r]ED>  [1-n*+n*h] -E s.  Each  market  varies  also  with the  uniqueness  of each
function  can  be  expanded  around  1.0,  using  a  industry,  as  measured  with  the  elasticities  of
3 Indexes RS  and RP were derived  from specific production functions. The results following from these specifications  are limited to the extent that (a)  the functional form is
reasonable;  (b) output cannot  be negative  (i.e.,  l+d >  0,  l+f > 0,  and  l+g >  0);  and (c) production  is in the second stage. The general solutions  are not preconditioned  on
more restrictive  values for d,f, or g. However,  some  of the subsequent discussions  will be centered  around the circumstances in which the M.E.M.  leads to some productivity
gains  (i.e.,  d >  0 and/or  f >  0).
4 Equations (12)  and (13)  have been expressed  as a power  series in (h-t) and (r-t). Note that letting t= 1 is equivalent to assuming that the Taylor series is  expanded from
values  corresponding initially to the spot market or where d=f=0. Furthermore,  if equation  (12) is expanded  for both variables in each power function (i.e., [m*,h]  and [n*,r]),
the  results will  be identical  to those in (12)  and  (13), assuming  t= 1. Equations  (12)  and (13)  show  the minimum  conditions that  must exist for f in order for output  to have
increased,  given a particular  degree of coordination.
19supply and demand.  When the non-spot intensity
is  concentrated  among  the  buyers  (n*  >  m*),
then the  minimum  level  of f lies  below the zero
plane in Figure 3. If the non-spot mechanism as-
sures that f > 0, then net gains in output through
a M.E.M. market would always  be expected,  re-
gardless  of the  elasiticity  levels.  Furthermore,
this increase in output would occur while the new
· '\.^  ~  T20.59~  equilibrium price is lower than would be the case
17.33  with spot transactions  only  [see equation (9)].  In
X  14.28  contrast,  when  m*  > n*,  the role  of elasticities
5.14  11.241  becomes  considerably  more  important  to  the
'  8.I9-  analysis, as shown with the upper plane in Figure
•  5.14  3.  A decline  in the elasticity of demand leads  to
"0 t  9  increases in f-min; whereas,  the more elastic the
~~..  -,:~'~':  ''￿R  supply,  the lower fmin becomes.  Hence,  coordi-
· ib,9s^l  ~  -~  --. ~:,~  ....... o,  nation in markets that have low elasticities  and a
%2%%~'~  "~,  ~concentration  of non-spot  sellers  (m*  >  n*)  is
.,--:..  g  . -,--.-  o~°0  ~,t  N  .less  likely  to  yield net increases  in  output over
*0~~o%  beWo0'  :.-that  of spot  exchange.  Supplies  would  increase
o0/  0  0^ o " only if f > f-min and f-min are relatively large as
'%\  o  9  - evidenced by the upper shaded portion of Figure
3.
FIGURE  2.  The  Minimum  Level  of  Product  Figure  3 provides  a framework  for evaluating
Charateristics  Required  for  a MM  Mrket  the  potential performance  expected  across mar-
Characteristics  Required  for  a  MEM  Market  kets.  In  general,  agricultural  markets  are  most Output to be Greater than SEM Market  likely depicted by the lower plane where n* > m*
or where many producers face a few buyers.  The
model  suggests that multiple mechanisms  would
lead  to  greater  output  at  lower  equilibrium
prices. The fact that n  < m does  not assure  that
n*  >  m*;  but  there  should  be  a high  positive
correlation between the two.
POTENTIAL APPLICATION
The M.E.M.  market  model  can be operation-
/W,/,/,"//,,  *  *\  alized by using estimates  of elasticities  of supply
/  mn*<  m  4.15  (Es)  and demand  (Ed)  and  estimates  of the  pa-
}2  '.;;g///'  3.67  rameters reflecting the potential cost and benefits
,'A//  ./h3.22  from non-spot  exchange  (i.e., d,f, and g).  These
2.77  parameters  could be estimated directly for those
"  2.32  markets  that have moved  from an  S.E.M.  to an
1..87  M.E.M.  market.  Alternatively,  they  might  be
1.42  I  approximated  by  using  managerial  judgment.
0  0-97  Once they are known for a particular commodity
*  m*o 05 0  market, performance  can be evaluated over vari-
ous  levels of coordination  intensity (i.e.,  n* and
-°n  o.Ioo,  m*),  using equations  (9) and  (11).
e  ?  ''  Q  -0.  6  -0.9  Risk can be introduced if d,f, and g are consid-
%"°^ ,/e*Xty  /11  <f~  ered  to  be  stochastic,  which  will make  the  RP
°%S!  ili·  sp  and RS indexes stochastic.  Furthermore, dynam-
>  ,°,  X° ^ics could be  entered into the  model by allowing
oO  4  for the possibility  of change  in  d,f,  and  g  over
time.  Stability  depends  upon  the  nature  of the
stochastic  and adjustment processes.
FIGURE  3.  The  Minimum  Level  of  Product
Characteristics  Required  for MEM  Market Out-
put to be Greater than a SEM Market for Differ-  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
ent Elasticities
It was assumed that the exchange performance
of  alternative  exchange  mechanisms  varies  de-
20pending  upon  its  effect  on product  characteris-  non-spot coordinating mechanism by buyers (n*)
tics, tranactions cost, and technology.  A multiple  is  greater  than  by  sellers  (m*),  and  non-spot
exchange  mechanism  (M.E.M.)  market  model  coordinating  mechanisms  improve  product
was  developed  to evaluate market performance.  characteristics  (f > 0),  then (1) the M.E.M. mar-
Performance  was measured by comparing prices  ket price  is  less  than the  S.E.M.  market  price,
and  supplies  forthcoming  through  M.E.M.  and  and (2) the M.E.M. market output is greater than
S.E.M.  markets.  the  S.E.M.  market  output.  Whereas,  the  com-
The price and output effects of a M.E.M.  mar-  petitive market can be shown, under certain con-
ket when  compared  with  a  S.E.M.  market  de-  ditions  to  yield  the  largest  output  among  eco- ket  when  compared  with  a  S.E.M.  market  de-  nm  m  Th  M  mk  addressedoi
pend greatly  on the proportion  of buyers using a  nomic models.  The M.E.M. market addressed in
non-spot  exchange  mechanism  relative  to  the  this article  can be shown to provide a larger out-
proportion  of sellers  using  non-spot  exchange  put and lower price under a different set of struc- proportion  of  sellers  using  non-spot  exchange  t  conditions.
mechanisms.  As  the  proportion  of non-spot  tura  conditions.
sellers (m*) increases relative to non-spot buyers  The  generality  of these  conclusions  needs
(n*),  the non-spot coordination  effect on product  further research.  The analytical  model in this ar-
characteristics,  transactions  cost,  and  technol-  tice  assumed  a  Cobb-Douglas-type  production
ogy must be greater.  Thus, the demand for use of  function, hence leading  to certain restrictions  on ogy must be greater.  Thus, the demand for use of  the  elasticity  for the  derived input demand.  Dif-
a  non-spot  coordinating  mechanism  by  sellers  the elasticity for the deved input demand.  Dif-
can  offset  the  potential  gains  in  output  to  be  ferent approaches  to entering  the non-spot mar-
realized  from  non-spot  coordination.  This  hap-  ket characteristics  into the model  could be  con- realized  from  non-spot  coordination.  This  hap-  sidered.  Risk  needs  to  be incorporated  into  the
pens even though the price received in a M.E.M.  sdee  s  ees to  be incorporated  into the
market  is  greater  than a price  in a S.E.M.  mar-  model,  as well as the dynamics  of adjustments.
ket,  when the proportion  of sellers using a non-  Nevertheless,  this  model  provides  the  basic
spot coordination  mechanism is  greater than the  framework  for incorporating  both  structural  dif-
proportion of buyers using the same mechanism.  ferences  and  degrees  of coordination  into  one
framework, from which additional variations can
When  the  relative  demand  for  the  use  of  a  be built.
REFERENCES
Arrow, K.  J.  "Vertical  Integration  and Communication."  Bell J. Econ.  6(1975):173-83.
Buccola,  S.  T. and B. C.  French. "Long-Term  Marketing Contracts:  Intra-Firm Optima and Inter-Firm
Agreements."  Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 61(1979):648-56.
Logan,  Samuel  H.  "A  Conceptual  Framework  for  Analyzing  Economics  of  Vertical  Integration."
Amer. J.  Agr. Econ.  51(1969):834-48.
Perry,  Martin  K.  "Vertical  Integration:  The Monopoly  Case." Amer.  Econ. Rev.  68(1978):561-70.
Stigler,  George  J.  "The  Division  of Labor  is  Limited  by the  Extent  of the  Market."  J. Pol. Econ.
59(1951): 185-93.
Williamson,  Oliver E.  "Market and Hierarchies:  Some Elementary Considerations."  Amer. Econ. Rev.
63(1973):316-25.
21I